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SYMPOSIUM: LEFLAR ON CONFLICTS
INTRODUCTION
ROBERT

L. FELix*

The following papers are a version, published in somewhat
altered sequence and form, of presentations and discussions regarding the work of Robert A. Leflar in the field of conflict of
laws. The remarks were delivered at a meeting of the section on
conflict of laws of the Association of American Law Schools in
Chicago on January 3, 1979. The occasion was the annual meeting
of the Association. Although Professor Leflar's work is noteworthy, as a matter of ordinary course, the dialogue was particularly
enlivened by the recent publication of the latest edition of his
treatise on conflict of laws.' As chairman of the section for 1978,
I had the happy task of organizing and moderating the program
for the evening.2 My efforts were at all times made easy by the
willing participation of Justice John Todd of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota, by Professors Maurice Rosenberg' of Columbia
University and Friedrich Juenger of the University of California
at Davis, and by Professor Leflar himself as guest of honor and
respondent.
I began the evening with a brief account of the editions of
Professor Leflar's treatise from its origin as a set of Arkansas
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; A.B., 1956, LL.B., 1959, University
of Cincinnati; M.A., 1962, University of British Columbia; LL.M., 1967, Harvard University.
1. R. LEFLAR, A RmucAN CONFLICTS LAW (3d ed. 1977).
2. Earlier in the day the indefatigable Professor Leflar had combined his roles as
Commissioner on Uniform State Laws and conflicts scholar by participating in the section's afternoon program. Other panelists in the program on uniform state laws and the
conflict of laws were Professor James Martin of Michigan; Professor Leonard Ratner of
the University of Southern California; Professor Jack Davies of the William Mitchell
School of Law, who is also a Minnesota state senator; and myself as moderator.
3. On leave 1978-79, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California.
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annotations to the first Restatement 4 to the pre-eminent position
of the present edition. Commenting on the latest version, I speculated that some of Professor Leflar's predictions were now being
followed. The analysis of Shaffer v. Heitner,5 though the discussion of the case had to be included specially in the treatise in
order to be published with it, contains most of what one finds in
later and more leisurely commentary.' Much in the role of an
admiring picador, I invited Professor Leflar to expand upon his
views regarding the relations between jurisdiction and choice of
law as one moves from one substantive field to another, and to
comment upon the possiblity that Kulko7 foretells a more aggressive filling in of the outlines of constitutional limitations on statecourt jurisdiction by the United States Supreme Court.
Next, Justice John Todd of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
presented a state court judge's view of the choice-of-law process
and the use of Leflar's choice-influencing considerations. Justice
Todd was particularly well qualified to participate in the program
because the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the Leflar
method of analyzing, deciding, and explaining choice-of-law
cases by candid exposition of choice-influencing considerations.'
Justice Todd has written several of these opinions, beginning with
Minnesota's first adoption of the Leflar method in Milkovich v.
Saari.9
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has declined, however, to
follow Professor Leflar's counsel to apply the choice-influencing
considerations to choice-of-law problems involving statutes as
well as common-law rules."0 This gave added interest to Justice
Todd's remarks and to the later exchange of views. Having participated in such decisions, Justice Todd had valuable insights into
4. See R. LEFLAR, THE ARKANSAS LAw OF CONFLIcr OF LAws (1938).
5. 433 U.S.'186 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Symposium: State-CourtJudicial Jurisdictionafter Shaffer v. Heitner,

63 IowA L. REV. 991 (1978) (articles based in large part on the panel discussion by Professors Vernon, Reese and Sedler at the December, 1977, meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools); Symposium: The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH.
U.L.Q. 273. An earlier treatment of the case that continues to stimulate thought is Casad,
Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in JurisdictionTheory?, 26 U. KAN. L. REV.
61 (1977).
7. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).

8. As Professor Leflar has identified them, the choice-influencing considerations are:
(1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3)
simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
(5) application of the better rule of law. R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, § 96 at 195.
9. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).

10. Compare Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884, 890 n.4 (Minn. 1978) with R. LEFLAR,
supra note 1, § 94 at 189-91.
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the court's reservations in the case of statutes. Like New York,
Minnesota has adhered to the doctrine of Seider v. Roth11 which
permits garnishment of a non-resident defendant's insurer doing
business in the forum state. At the time of the program, Minnesota had recently reaffirmed that stand following the vacating
and remanding of its first post-Shaffer decision for further consideration in the light of the Shaffer opinion. 2 The stage was thus
set for the dialogue that appears in the following pages regarding
the sometimes uneasy balance between due process and equal
protection in such matters and in their choice-of-law repercussions.
Professor Juenger's presentation combined a graceful assessment of Professor Leflar's place in the tradition of our subject and
in its antecedents in private international law. Professor Juenger
vigorously reminded us that law must serve practical needs and
requires a methodology that identifies those needs and explains
attending to them in a way that keeps this function in useful
perspective. Professor Juenger developed the idea that Professor
Leflar's contributions to conflicts theory have uncovered and
helped to facilitate and make understandable the practical social
aims of common-law decisionmaking. It was the consensus of all
that Professor Juenger's subject matter itself put the dual aspects
of his presentation in easy harmony.
Next, Professor Rosenberg, with characteristic wit and verve,
examined the Leflar thesis that choice of law has reached a position of relative stability achieved through an eclectic blend of
modem methodologies followithg the repudiation or abandonment
of first Restatement 3 systematics by most states. More specifi11. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). Compare O'Connor v.
Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 638 (1978) with
Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 245 N.W.2d 624.(1976), vacated and remanded in light
of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 902 (1977). Recently the Supreme Court of Minnesota
reaffirmed its original decision, Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), relying
in part on several post-Shaffer New York state and federal cases adhering to the Seider
doctrine, notably O'Connor. In light of reaffirmation and further appeal, the United
States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. 99 S. Ct. 1211 (1979). Ip early
October, the Court heard argument in the case. Rush v. Savchuk, 48 U.S.L.W. 3238
(Oct. 9, 1979).
[EDs. NOTE: On Jan. 21, 1980, when this issue was in final publication stages, the United
States Supreme Court reversed Rush v. Savchuk, 48 U.S.L.W. 4088 (Jan. 22, 1980).
Additionally, the Court reversed World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351
(Okla. 1978), rev'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 4079 (Jan. 22, 1980). The reader should consider these
reversals in connection with discussions in this Symposium by Professor Felix, pp. 430-31
infra; Justice Todd, p. 441 infra; and Professor Leflar, p. 461 n.18 & pp. 463-65 infra.]
12. Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978). See note 11 supra.
13. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1934).
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cally, Professor Rosenberg focused upon choice-of-law developments in New York where decisions have, from Professor Leflar's
viewpoint, been a fly in the ointment. The issue was joined on the
basis of Professor Leflar's optimistic survey of the choice-of-law
terrain.'4 Professor Rosenberg's spirited performance set the stage
for entertaining and thought-provoking repartee with Professor
Leflar, especially regarding the opinion by the New York Court
of Appeals in Neumeier v. Kuehner'5 and the controversial interpretation of the Neumeier doctrine by the United States Court
6
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rosenthal v. Warren."
Professor Leflar responded to the remarks of the panelists at
some length in order to consider as many as possible of the points
raised. He did not share Professor Rosenberg's optimism regarding the development of a jurisprudence of rules designed to cut
down the flow of repetitious litigation in the class of cases covered
by a given rule. He expressed preference for a jurisprudence of
policies designed to achieve a comparable goal but through the
flexible application of more general postulates such as his own
choice-influencing considerations. Professor Leflar's discussion of
the uses and misuses of parochialism, particularly in regard to the
decision in Rosenthal, gave considerable focus to the discussion.
The papers set out here give a good idea of the program.
What is necessarily lost in the way of spontaneity and informality
is offset by the greater opportunity that print gives for study and
reflection and by the modest bit of updating to allude to pertinent
matters that have occurred since the time of the program. This
group of papers is written testimony of an evening well spent.
14.
(Spring
15.
16.

Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 10
1977).
31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
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